Descartes is possibly the most famous of all writers on the mind, but his theory of mind has been almost universally misunderstood, because his philosophy has not been seen in the context of his scientific work. Desmond Clarke offers a radical and convincing rereading, undoing the received perception of Descartes as the chief defender of mind/body dualism. For Clarke, the key is to interpret his philosophical efforts as an attempt to reconcile his scientific pursuits with the theologically orthodox views (...) of his time. (shrink)

Desmond M. Clarke presents new translations, from French and Latin, of three of the first feminist tracts to support explicitly the equality of men and women: Marie le Jars de Gournay's The Equality of Men and Women, Anna Maria van Schurman's Dissertation, and François Poulain de la Barre's Physical and Moral Discourse concerning the Equality of Both Sexes. These works transformed the language and conceptual framework in which questions about women's equality were subsequently discussed. This edition includes new translations, (...) from French and Latin, of these three feminist authors, excerpts from their related writings, together with an extensive introduction to the religious and philosophical context within which they argued against the traditional view of women's natural inferiority to men. (shrink)

René Descartes is best remembered today for writing 'I think, therefore I am', but his main contribution to the history of ideas was his effort to construct a philosophy that would be sympathetic to the new sciences that emerged in the seventeenth century. To a great extent he was the midwife to the Scientific Revolution and a significant contributor to its key concepts. In four major publications, he fashioned a philosophical system that accommodated the needs of these new sciences and (...) thereby earned the unrelenting hostility of both Catholic and Calvinist theologians, who relied on the scholastic philosophy that Descartes hoped to replace. His contemporaries claimed that his proofs of God's existence in the Meditations were so unsuccessful that he must have been a cryptic atheist and that his discussion of skepticism served merely to fan the flames of libertinism. This is the first biography in English that addresses the full range of Descartes' interest in theology, philosophy and the sciences and that traces his intellectual development through his entire career. (shrink)

ONE Introduction Rene Descartes is, in many ways, a victim of his own success as a philosopher. He notoriously wrote a small number of readily accessible, ...

Desmond M. Clarke presents a thematic history of French philosophy from the middle of the sixteenth century to the beginning of Louis XIV's reign. While the traditional philosophy of the schools was taught throughout this period by authors who have faded into permanent obscurity, a whole generation of writers who were not professional philosophers--some of whom never even attended a school or college--addressed issues that were prominent in French public life. Clarke explores such topics as the novel political theory (...) espoused by monarchomachs against Bodin's account of absolute sovereignty; the scepticism of Montaigne, Charron, and Sanches; the ethical discussions of Du Vair, Gassendi, and Pascal; innovations in natural philosophy; theories of the human mind from Jean de Silhon to Cureau de la Chambre and Descartes; and novel arguments in support of women's education and equality. The writers involved were lawyers, political leaders, theologians, and independent scholars who acknowledged the authority of the Bible as a source of knowledge, while raising questions about faith and reason. (shrink)

In Malebranche's account of occasional causality, God exercises his general will with respect to every event that merits a causal explanation. Nadler distinguishes two pictures of God's involvement; (1) there are as many distinct acts of God's will as there are causal events to be explained; (2) God's will is exercised once only, when the natural order of causes is created. I argue that Malebranche's concept of God is inconsistent with a real distinction between God and acts of his will, (...) and with using temporal parameters to identify God's acts. Thus, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to Malebranche's occasionalist concurrence. (shrink)

George Berkeley was a university teacher, a missionary, and later a Church of Ireland bishop. The over-riding objective of his long philosophical career was to counteract objections to religious belief that resulted from new philosophies associated with the Scientific Revolution. Accordingly, he argued against scepticism and atheism in the Principles and the Three Dialogues; he rejected theories of force in the Essay on Motion; he offered a new theory of meaning for religious language in Alciphron; and he modified his earlier (...) immaterialism in Siris by speculating about the body's influence on the soul. His radical empiricism and scientific instrumentalism, which rejected the claims of the sciences to provide a realistic interpretation of phenomena, are still influential today. This edition provides texts from the full range of Berkeley's contributions to philosophy, together with an introduction by Desmond M. Clarke that sets them in their historical and philosophical contexts. (shrink)

In this Handbook twenty-six leading scholars survey the development of philosophy between the middle of the sixteenth century and the early eighteenth century.

This book analyses the concept of scientific explanation developed by French disciples of Descartes in the period 1660-1700. Clarke examines the views of authors such as Malebranche and Rohault, as well as those of less well-known authors such as Cordemoy, Gadroys, Poisson and R'egis. These Cartesian natural philosophers developed an understanding of scientific explanation as necessarily hypothetical, and, while they contributed little to new scientific discoveries, they made a lasting contribution to our concept of explanation--generations of scientists in subsequent centuries (...) followed their lead. (shrink)

This article examines the epistemological aspects of religious belief in early modern Europe. It suggests that the most prominent feature of Christian creeds during this period was their plurality and mutual inconsistency and that efforts to address this issue focused on the capacity of our natural cognitive faculties to limit the scope of faith and to establish the authenticity and meaning of documents that were said to have been inspired by God. It was widely accepted that the probability of any (...) religious belief depends on the probability that it was revealed by God and that it has been correctly interpreted. Thus, the proliferation of inconsistent creeds by a wide range of churches provided many reasons to doubt both the source and the interpretation of doctrines that were presented as if they were indubitable. (shrink)

This major new study of Descartes explores a number of key issues, including his use of experience and reason in science; the metaphysical foundations of Cartesian science; the Cartesian concept of explanation and proof; and an empiricist interpretation of the _Regulae_ and the _Discourse_. Dr. Clarke argues that labels such as empiricism and rationalism are useless for understanding Descartes because, at least in his scientific methodology, he is very much an Aristotelian for whom reflection on ordinary experience is the primary (...) source of scientific hypotheses. Descartes traditionally has been presented as a classic example of rationalism in science, especially by philosophers who concentrated their attention on the _Meditations_ or the _Discourse_. A different perspective is gained by reading Descartes as a practicing scientist and by examining his scientific work and correspondence with other seventeenth-century scientists. These texts suggest that the author relies very much on experience, and in some cases on scientific experiments to support his theories or to dispute those of others. Descartes scientific practice is even consistent with a less rationalistic interpretation of the _Regulae_ and the _Discourse_ than is normally defended. (shrink)

Descartes is possibly the most famous of all writers on the mind, but his theory of mind has been almost universally misunderstood, because his philosophy has not been seen in the context of his scientific work. Desmond Clarke offers a radical and convincing rereading, undoing the received perception of Descartes as the chief defender of mind/body dualism. For Clarke, the key is to interpret his philosophical efforts as an attempt to reconcile his scientific pursuits with the theologically orthodox views (...) of his time. (shrink)

Many recent decisions in tort law attempt to combine two conceptually incommensurable features: a traditional 'but for' test of factual causation, and the scientific or medical evidence that is required to explain how some injury occurred. Even when applied to macroscopic objects, the 'but for' test fails to identify causes, because it merely rephrases in the language of possible worlds what may be inferred from what is inductively known about the actual world. Since scientific theories explain the occurrence of events (...) without reference to causes, this test of causation is not only ineffectual but also inapplicable to scientific or medical evidence. Tort law, therefore, should abandon the 'but for' test; when scientific or medical evidence is required in a tort case, the courts should rely on the explanatory strategies that function within the theories from which they borrow such evidence. (shrink)

We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In (...) such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs? (shrink)

The Cartesian explanation of emotions relies on the theory of animal spirits that is central to his account of sensation and a hypothesis about innate desires and aversions. Emotions are the distinctive feelings we experience in response to the apparent perception of things that satisfy or frustrate our natural desires. These feelings, similar to internal sensations, correspond systematically to patterns in the flow of animal spirits from the heart to the brain.

IN discussions of the identity theory of mind, there is constant recourse to two related types of argument, from ordinary language usage, to the effect that the theory in question is either false or meaningless. We can refer to the two arguments under discussion as the category argument and the meaninglessness argument. If either one of these arguments were well founded we could decide a priori without waiting for further research in the relevant sciences, whether or not the mind could (...) be identified with processes of the central nervous system. The answer would be in the negative. It is proposed to examine these two arguments here, and to question the persuasive simplicity with which they have been frequently put forward. If they do not bear up well under closer scrutiny we may not, of course, conclude to the truth of the identity theory; we will conclude only that it has not been a priori eliminated, by these arguments, as a contender for the solution of the mind-body problem. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Matter in the World Extension as a Property of Matter “Body” in the Meditations Body as Non‐Mind Basic Concepts A Proof of the Existence of Bodies Cartesian Limitations.

Descartes' methodology is ambiguous about the role of empirical evidence in science. This ambiguity does not derive from Rationalist qualms about the specifically empirical character of such evidence; for the apparant clash of experience and reason is explained by the need to re-interpret perceptions in terms of new theories, and by the frequently "contaminated" status of so-called experimental evidence. The ambiguity results, rather, from: (a) Descartes' predilection for "ordinary experience" rather than experiments as a source of warrant, and (b) the (...) looseness of fit between hypotheses and confirming evidence. The mathematical ideal of science is a camouflage for a naive, and conceptually impoverished, empiricism. (shrink)

Nach der üblichen Interpretation löst der Rationalist Descartes empirische Fragen durch einen Rekurs auf die Evidenz der Vernunft, wobei er dieser den Vorzug gegenüber offensichtlich widersprechenden Erfahrungstatsachen einräumt. Dieser Aufsatz stellt 1. einige relevante Züge der Cartesischen Theorie des Subjekts des Erfahrungswissens dar; 2. untersucht er die Vielfalt der Bedeutungen, in denen Descartes das Wort expérience gebraucht, und 3. sucht er zu zeigen, daß die Texte, in denen Descartes behauptet, er ziehe die Vernunft der Erfahrung vor, in Übereinstimmung mit 1. (...) und 2. interpretiert werden können als eine Wahl zwischen zwei Arten von empirischer Evidenz und nicht als Zusammenstoß konkurrierender Vermögen. (shrink)

René Descartes is best remembered today for writing 'I think, therefore I am', but his main contribution to the history of ideas was his effort to construct a philosophy that would be sympathetic to the new sciences that emerged in the seventeenth century. To a great extent he was the midwife to the Scientific Revolution and a significant contributor to its key concepts. In four major publications, he fashioned a philosophical system that accommodated the needs of these new sciences and (...) thereby earned the unrelenting hostility of both Catholic and Calvinist theologians, who relied on the scholastic philosophy that Descartes hoped to replace. His contemporaries claimed that his proofs of God's existence in the Meditations were so unsuccessful that he must have been a cryptic atheist and that his discussion of skepticism served merely to fan the flames of libertinism. This is the first biography in English that addresses the full range of Descartes' interest in theology, philosophy and the sciences and that traces his intellectual development through his entire career. (shrink)

Descartes explains memory and imagination, as ideas, by patterns in the flow of animal spirits through the brain that are caused by traces of former sensations or by other bodily conditions that are more active when we sleep or daydream. Despite the contrast with intuition, imagination constructs reliable images of perceptual phenomena, by synthesizing incoming signals from different senses.

Opponents of women's education assumed that women were less naturally gifted than men, that education was inappropriate for Christian women, or that it was irrational to educate women because they could not fulfil the civil and ecclesiastical offices for which education was the required preparation. Van Schurman argued against all three assumptions in her Dissertatio . She presented her arguments as syllogisms, which she based on the authority of the Bible, on the Christian churches' understanding of human nature, and on (...) the necessity of knowledge to acquire virtues and to avoid falling into heresy. Van Schurman concluded that education was appropriate for women, in general, for exactly the same reasons as it was appropriate for men. Les opposants à une éducation des femmes considéraient qu'elles étaient naturellement moins douées que les hommes, que l'éducation était quelque chose d'inapproprié pour les femmes chrétiennes, ou qu'il était irrationnel d'éduquer les femmes car elles ne remplissent aucune charges civile ou ecclé siastique, charges pour lesquelles l'éducation constituait une préparation requise. Van Schurman discute ces trois assertions dans sa Dissertatio . Elle présente ses arguments comme des syllogismes, qu'elle fonde sur l'autorité de la Bible, sur la compréhension de la nature humaine par les églises chrétiennes, et sur la nécessité de la connaissance pour acquérir de la vertu et pour éviter de tomber dans l'hérésie. Van Schurman conclut qu'il est approprié que les femmes en général soient éduquées, tout comme cela est approprié pour les hommes. (shrink)

This article thinks about changes in the conception of hypothesis during the early modern period. It explains that during this period there was an urgency to redefine human knowledge so that uncertainty became one of its inevitable and acceptable features, and certainty was replaced by probability as an adequate achievement in knowledge of the natural world. It discusses Isaac Newton's deep-seated rejection of hypotheses and the assumption that their use in natural philosophy would compromise its status as genuine scientific knowledge.

Marjorie Grene has argued in a number of contexts that any attempt to reduce the explanation of human actions to “mechanistic” explanations is doomed to failure in advance because it is absurd. “This argument examines the status of the reductivist thesis in its own terms and reduces it to absurdity …” ; “the attempt to reduce human purposive, or ‘intentional,‘ action to physiology and ultimately to physics and chemistry is an absurdity rather than simply a confusion”. I wish to show (...) that this argument is fallacious because it involves a petitio principii; and if Plato can be credited with introducing the same argument in the Theaetetus, as she suggests, so much the worse for Plato. (shrink)

We have inherited from the history of moral philosophy two very different proposals about how we ought to behave. According to one view, we are required to do what is morally right; on the alternative formulation, we are required to do what we believe to be morally right. Unless these twin demands on our moral decision-making can be made to coincide by definition, it is inevitable that in some cases our beliefs about what is morally right may be mistaken. In (...) such cases, it is not clear what we are morally required to do. Are we obliged to follow our conscience in every situation, i.e. to act according to our moral beliefs, or is it sometimes permissible not to act according to our own moral beliefs? (shrink)

Descartes argued that the model for genuine explanation is provided by natural philosophy and that scholastic theories that appeal to substantial forms or real qualities are pseudo‐explanations. Thus, one cannot explain mental acts by reference to a mental substance. The intractability of mind–body interaction illustrates the limits of our explanatory success to date.